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“[T]he more I come to think of you, you 
noble one [Socrates], you were the only 
one who nobly and profoundly 
understood what comedy is and when it is 
appropriate to a high-minded spirit”.1
 
Is a sense of humour a virtue? In an informal sense of the term ‘virtue’, of 
course it is. A sense of humour is a trait nobody wants to be thought of as lacking, and 
one that we value in partners, friends and colleagues alike. But the claim that a sense 
of humour is a moral virtue seems far more controversial. Yet in a fascinating article, 
just this claim has been advanced by Robert C. Roberts,2 who relates it to the further 
claim that there are figures, such as Socrates and Tolstoy, “whose wisdom was 
partially constituted by a sense of humour”.3 Now, if it is right that certain forms of 
wisdom are partially constituted by the possession of a certain sense of humour, then 
it is a likely corollary that the development of such wisdom goes hand in hand with 
the development of such a sense of humour. In which case, the development of such a 
sense of humour would be a significant dimension of moral education, understood as 
a training in the virtues.  
 
These claims are related to the idea that we sometimes experience ‘aspect-
dawning’ of ethical depth and profundity. It seems reasonable to claim that aspect-
dawning – coming to ‘see as’ differently, ‘cottoning on’ to a particular way of seeing 
– is central to humour. (Consider the basic cognitive shift involved in ‘getting’ a 
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joke.) As I shall aim to show, Roberts succeeds in showing that such a change of 
aspect can sometimes be ethically significant: when it enables one, through what 
Kierkegaard calls the ‘leap’ of ethical transition, to enter a fundamentally different 
ethical perspective, as a result of which one’s moral ‘vision’ is transformed. 
Moreover, we standardly think of humour as a pleasurable phenomenon. And 
Aristotle claims that pleasure is an index of the virtues: that is, what I take pleasure in 
is an index of my character. If this is so, this lends a prima facie plausibility to 
Roberts’ claim that one index of one’s character is one’s sense of humour. Could it 
be, then, that exposure to a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour can make a difference to my 
character, and therefore be a useful tool in moral education?  
 
In what follows, I shall begin to explore the question of what features a sense 
of humour would need to have to count as ‘virtuous’, and to discuss the 
corresponding dangers of a ‘vicious’ sense of humour. I shall also suggest that what 
Aristotle calls fine ‘discernment’ in relation to the ethical dimension of a sense of 
humour might involve seeing that a sense of humour is only a virtue if it is linked to 
other virtues. But here I part company with Roberts, in two ways. First, I suggest that 
we need to distinguish two distinct claims that Roberts conflates: whether a sense of 
humour is a trait highly useful in the development of the virtues, and whether it is 
itself a distinct virtue. The former seems to me more plausible than the latter, and is 
actually quite sufficient to support most of what Roberts wants to claim. Second, 
Roberts claims that in order to be a virtue, a sense of humour must be allied with 
compassion and hope. A version of such a claim might still be made by someone who 
accepted the above qualification. That is, even if one held that a sense of humour is a 
trait highly useful in the development of the virtues rather than being itself a distinct 
virtue, one might still think that such a trait was a manifestation of virtue only if allied 
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with compassion and hope. However, I shall argue that such a view would be wrong. 
First, Roberts does not explain why we should select these two virtues in particular 
for such special treatment. Second, I aim to show that humour lacking these qualities 
can still nevertheless play roles of vital ethical importance, such as fostering the self-
recognition on which self-knowledge depends. Insofar as self-knowledge is an 
essential factor in the development of the virtues, such a sense of humour can still 
count as ‘virtuous’.  
 
I. Humour, virtues and the human telos 
 
The idea of a sense of humour as a virtue has its roots in Aristotle. In a short, 
often overlooked section of book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle recognises 
wit [eutrapelia] as a moral virtue, but chiefly because “one part of life is relaxation, 
and one aspect of this is entertaining conversation” (1128a).4 I want to make a bolder 
claim about the ethical significance of a certain kind of sense of humour than this. It 
is valuable not only in a dinner party guest or such like, but is of much more central 
importance in the development of our moral vision.  
 
According to Aristotle, a virtue is a hexis ([habitual] disposition). Moreover, it 
is “the disposition that makes one a good man and causes him to perform his function 
well” (1106a). Roberts implicitly draws on this background: the idea that virtue 
theorists standardly presuppose the existence of a human nature and telos. He argues 
that to possess a virtue is to have realised at least one aspect of that nature, and that 
thus a virtue amounts to “a congruity between one’s character and one’s nature”.5 (If 
it is part of my telos to possess the virtue of courage, say, and I do indeed possess 
this, then there is a match between what I am and what I ought to be.) Conversely, a 
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moral failure - where one falls short of the human telos in some respect - is an 
incongruity between one’s nature or telos, and one’s character. For the virtue ethicist, 
perceiving such incongruities “would be a mark of moral knowledge, and the 
disposition to perceive them could be counted an important part of wisdom”.6 But 
incongruity is often held to be central to humour.7 Though humour only occasionally 
seems to depend upon outright contradiction (such as in the schoolboy howler 
“Lincoln was a great Kentuckian. He was born in a log cabin, which he built with his 
own hands.”8), it often seems to depend upon a “softer” kind of incongruity: what one 
commentator calls “the linking of disparates, … the collision of different mental 
spheres, … [or] the obtrusion into one context of what belongs in another”.9  To give 
but one example, Paul Merton”s confession that he has always wanted to ask Lee 
Harvey Oswald: “Can you remember what you were doing when President Kennedy 
was assassinated?”. Roberts notes that for Socrates, human well-being depends upon 
caring more about such features as integrity than about such factors as one’s wealth or 
reputation. But he adds: “One gets the impression that the lack of congruity between 
real well-being and what people pursued as their well-being ... often struck him as 
comical.”10 One might be tempted to quote examples in support of this claim, and 
indeed Roberts references various examples of Socrates’ dry, ironic sense of humour. 
I shall give but one, from the Apology. This occurs at the point where Socrates, 
having been found guilty, has to propose a suitable punishment: 
I tried to persuade each one of you not to think more of practical advantages 
than of his mental and moral well-being …What do I deserve for behaving in 
this way? Some reward, gentlemen, if I am bound to suggest what I really 
deserve … Nothing could be more appropriate for such a person than free 
maintenance at the state’s expense.11
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But it is important to realise that an awareness of this ironic sense of humour is 
something that emerges over a growing acquaintance with Socrates’ personality as 
one reads Plato’s early dialogues: it cannot be captured simply by quoting isolated 
examples of it.12 The reason why this is important will become clearer over the course 
of our discussion, but we can start to see the point by considering Roberts’ claim that 
to perceive as comical the incongruity between a person’s well-being and what they 
pursue as their well-being:  
is an achievement quite above most of us, for whom there is little incongruity to 
be perceived in pursuing wealth, reputation, and physical well-being as the 
highest ends (even if we give lip service to Socrates’ opinion that there is 
something higher). It is one thing to know that there is incongruity here. But to 
see it so vividly and so confidently as to see the humor in it suggests either that 
one is frankly native to the viewpoint from which the incongruities are 
perceived (like Socrates) or that one has been drawn into that viewpoint for the 
moment by a skilful humorist.13  
 
One important point that this quote brings out is that a genuine instance of 
‘aspect-dawning’ is necessary genuinely to share the humour here. Mere intellectual 
assent to Socrates’ point of view (“lip service”) will not do. (Compare ‘getting’ a joke 
in the sense of merely understanding what the joke is supposed to be, with ‘getting’ it 
in the sense of actually finding it funny.) Moreover, Socrates often seems to take a 
certain pleasure in the incongruity he sees. And according to Aristotle, in Myles 
Burnyeat’s words, “to learn to do what is virtuous, to make it a habit or second nature 
to one, is among other things to learn to … take pleasure - the appropriate pleasure – 
in doing it”.14 If this is right, coming to see or feel a perspective as one’s native 
6 
perspective and to take an appropriate pleasure in doing so is an important part of a 
training in virtue.  
 
However, finding something comical is clearly only one of a range of possible 
responses to finding it incongruous.15 So when is seeing as comical the incongruity 
between someone’s character and their nature an appropriate response? Why not 
rather feel concern or alarm at the moral failings of oneself or another? I take there to 
be at least two dimensions to this question. The first part of an answer might be given 
by considering what the ethical advantages of developing a taste for incongruity could 
be. Can we show that a taste for incongruity - something that is prima facie ethically 
neutral – in fact has potential advantages in the formation of ethical character? The 
second part requires a response to the possible objection that certain forms of 
amusement – especially, perhaps, at one’s own failings – involve ethical evasion. I 
shall aim to deal with each of these questions in turn.  
 
II. The ethical advantages of a taste for incongruity 
 
The development of sensitivity to incongruity gives us several benefits. First, 
part of such sensitivity is a heightened awareness of the discrepancy between what 
people say and what they do. (Compare here Roberts’ remarks on Socrates). And 
John Morreall has suggested that a person with such awareness is more likely to see 
people’s feet of clay, and thus be less gullible, less susceptible to demagoguery.16 
Second, of more fundamental ethical relevance, such an awareness of discrepancy is a 
useful tool in transcending the concerns of one’s own current self: in developing 
‘comic distance’ (akin to what Roberts calls ‘dissociation’). This ability to step 
outside one’s own immediate concerns is surely essential to the development of any 
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‘moral’ point of view.  For example, on a broadly Aristotelian picture, as I strive for 
virtue I need to be able to get at least sufficient distance from my character to be able 
to compare it to my telos as embodied in the virtuous agent. (Aristotle claims that 
“the man of good character … is a sort of standard and yardstick of what is fine and 
pleasant” (1113a).) This is presumably what Roberts means when he claims that 
“self-transcendence, especially the capacity to transcend one’s own character, is a 
presupposition of the life of virtue”.17  Third, more specifically, the cultivation of 
such comic distance is necessary in the development of such virtues (or quasi-virtues) 
as patience, perseverance and humility. In these and perhaps in other ways, a sense of 
humour can be a useful tool in the development of one’s moral character. But I 
suggest that we shall understand this better by further investigating Roberts’ claim 
that a sense of humor can be “an index of character”.18 Like much else in this 
discussion, this thesis has its roots in Aristotle, and it will be useful for our purposes 
to show these roots more explicitly than does Roberts.  
 
III. A sense of humour as an index of character 
 
Let us start by returning to Aristotle’s general account of the virtues. 
Famously, he defines a virtue as aiming to hit the mean between excess and 
deficiency. Moral virtue, he claims, “is concerned with feelings and actions” such as 
“fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain generally” (1106b). Any 
of these, he continues, can be felt too much or too little. “But to have these feelings at 
the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and 
in the right way is to feel them to an intermediate, that is to the best, degree; and this 
is the mark of virtue” (1106b). Aristotle’s discussion of eutrapelia fits this general 
characterisation. Excess and deficiency are here represented by the buffoon and the 
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boor respectively. Buffoons [bomolochoi] are those “who go too far in being funny”: 
they are “vulgar persons who exert themselves to be funny at all costs, and who are 
more set upon raising a laugh than upon decency of expression and consideration for 
their victim”s feelings” (1128a). On the other hand, “[t]hose who both refuse to say 
anything funny themselves and take exception to the jokes of other people are 
regarded as boorish and sour” (1128a). As usual, Aristotle wants us to hit the mean: 
“those who exercise their humour with good taste are called witty [eutrapelos], as one 
might say ‘nimble-witted’” (1128a).  
 
As mentioned earlier, Aristotle’s discussion places these qualities in the 
context of entertaining conversation of the kind befitting the Athenian nobleman. So 
he objects to the buffoon, for instance, because he says “things that a man of taste 
would never dream of saying, and some that he would not listen to either” (1128b). 
But I am arguing – along with Roberts - that the ethical significance of humour is 
more wide-ranging than this. Considering part of St. Thomas Aquinas’ gloss on 
Aristotle’s discussion can help us to see why. According to Aquinas’ explanation of 
this part of the Ethics, those deficient in eutrapelia appear “to be ‘agrii’, that is, 
‘boorish’ and hard, because they are not softened by the pleasure of play”.19 Unlike 
the witty person, the boor, lacking such softening, simply takes himself and life’s 
travails too seriously. Thus understood, this ‘softening’ – breaking down the barriers 
of excessive seriousness and self-importance - seems an important prolegomena to 
developing the capacity for self-transcendence.  
 
According to Aristotle, the mean is judged not with reference to any general 
principle, but “the decision lies with our perception” (1109b), and the right action is 
judged with reference to what the virtuous agent would do. So the simple answer to 
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the question of what qualities a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour would have to possess is 
“those possessed by the sense of humour of a virtuous agent”. Clearly, at a first 
glance this doesn’t seem to help. So what more can we say to get beyond this?  
 
IIIi. Perspectivity and the index of character 
 
To say that a virtuous sense of humour is that of a virtuous agent is not sheer 
filibustering evasion. To see why, recall the earlier claim that a talented humorist can 
bring us round to a particular new way of seeing. This is a version of what Roberts 
calls ‘perspectivity’: the ability - very important in the appreciation of humour - to 
share something of the perspective or ‘vision’ of another. This is why the reference to 
the character of the virtuous agent is important. Moreover,  
[h]umor depends on “being there”, on being in a position to have just the right 
Gestalt as provided by setting, background, mood, shared language, and 
experience; and it seems to be this sense of or orientation in the normal … that 
provides the “perspective” required for appreciating a piece of humor.20
To find humorous, say, what Socrates finds humorous about people’s tendency to 
pursue illusory forms of well-being depends upon our “having access to [his] 
perspective on human attitudes and behavior”.21  
 
It is worth pausing to ask exactly what is meant here by ‘having access to’. It 
cannot mean - at least to begin with – ‘sharing’, in the full sense of that term, 
otherwise one could not be brought around to seeing things in the ‘new’ way, since 
one would have to be there already. (This is a specific instance of a more general 
point about Aristotle’s Ethics: the question of what its intended audience already 
possesses, and what they still need, in relation to training in virtue.)  A first 
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suggestion, then, might be that it involves entertaining the ‘new’ position 
hypothetically: trying to view the world ‘as if’ Socrates’ view were the case. But, 
unless strongly qualified, that will hardly do: it sounds far too intellectualist. What is 
required, I suggest, is an imaginative identification or engagement with the ‘new’ 
point of view. Richard Moran has distinguished between ‘hypothetical’ and 
‘dramatic’ imagination, and what I have in mind is what Moran seems to mean by the 
latter.22 Whereas ‘hypothetical’ imagination involves assuming something to be true 
and seeing what consequences follow, ‘dramatic’ imagination “involves something 
more like a point of view, a total perspective … And imagining along these lines 
involves something more like genuine rehearsal, ‘trying on’ the point of view, trying 
to determine what it is like to inhabit it”.23 A large part of the ‘skill’ of Roberts’ 
humorist is that he makes this imagining easier for us, at least in the sense that he 
initiates a process that may culminate in our genuinely coming to ‘see’ the world from 
this alternative point of view. It goes without saying that a prerequisite for such 
imagining is the ability to stand outside one’s own current concerns. But crucial for 
our purposes is the question of what the result of regular exposure to such humour 
might be. In a discussion of this, Roberts makes the following suggestion as to the 
dangers of entering into a racist or sexist view in order to ‘appreciate’ racist or sexist 
jokes:  
If I indulge regularly and gleefully in sexist humor, and have no corresponding 
taste and time, say, for humor that “puts down” male chauvinists, I should 
consider myself in danger of falling into a kind of addiction of “vision” which 
may lead to a change in my commitments and character.24  
However, what matters for our purposes is that there can be positive as well as 
negative “addictions of ‘vision’.” Just as a racist and sexist joke could be enjoyed, in 
the right circumstances, by one who is not himself racist or sexist, so “virtuous humor 
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like that of Socrates ... can be enjoyed by those who are not virtuous, though it is 
unlikely to originate among them”.25 What is of most interest about this for our 
purposes is the following claim:  
[J]ust as the enjoyment of vicious [e.g., racist or sexist] humour is a “seeing” 
from the perspective of vice and has thus the tendency to convert one, or 
confirm one, in vice; so the enjoyment of Socratic ... humor is a “seeing” from 
the perspective of virtue and has the tendency to convert one, or confirm one, in 
virtue. Thus the “playful” character of humor is one source of its moral 
importance. It is because people are not locked, by virtue of their beliefs, in a 
particular humor perspective, that it can function as a bridge from virtue to vice 
and from vice to virtue. We can play at thinking with Socrates just as we can 
play at thinking with the sexists. And if a virtues-humorist like Socrates (or we 
ourselves, if we have undertaken a project of moral growth) can get us much 
involved in seeing the incongruities in vice, then the enjoyment of that humor 
which at first nudges us toward virtue, may come at last to express it in us.26
 
In other words, to borrow Moran’s phrase, we have in such cases ‘tried on’ such 
a point of view sufficiently often to find that it has eventually come to ‘fit’ us. Thus – 
and this is the main point - we reach something like Aristotle’s conclusion: that 
character is formed largely through habituation, and that the right role models are 
crucial, in developing a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour just as much as in developing any 
given virtue.27  
 
IV. Humour as a “boundary zone”: a Kierkegaardian excursus 
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But who is capable of developing such a sense of humour? Implicit in 
Roberts’ discussion is the idea that those most likely to be brought around to such a 
vision are those already on its boundaries. This fits with the way Aristotle’s Ethics is 
often read more generally. As Burnyeat puts it, “he is giving a course in practical 
thinking to enable someone who already wants to be virtuous to understand better 
what he should do and why”.28 But this is made explicit in reference to humour (or, to 
use his more general term, ‘the comic’) by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Climacus, who repeatedly 
describes himself as a ‘humorist’, famously, but prima facie bizarrely, claims that two 
forms of the comic – irony and humour - are “boundary zones” between the 
Kierkegaardian existence-spheres. A life-view of irony is said to be on the boundary 
between the aesthetic and ethical views of life, humour between the ethical and the 
religious views of life. 29 We do not need, for our purposes here, to go into detail 
about what Kierkegaard means by the aesthetic, ethical and religious existence-
spheres: it is sufficient to know that, on Climacus’ schema, the ethical is ‘higher’ than 
the aesthetic, the religious ‘higher’ than the ethical.  Most Kierkegaard commentators 
have been at a loss to explain why two forms of the comic, specifically, should play 
this “boundary zone” role. But our discussion so far about a ‘virtuous’ sense of 
humour enables us to suggest an answer. The role of irony and humour as “boundary 
zones” involves relating oneself to a ‘higher’ position that one has not embraced, but 
is nevertheless making some attempt to identify or engage with imaginatively, after 
the fashion of Moran’s ‘dramatic’ imagination.  The last quote from Roberts above 
makes it possible to see how, through such imaginative identification or engagement, 
the genuine appropriation of a ‘higher’ perspective might actually take place. Jamie 
Ferreira has shown that, contrary to the popular picture of Kierkegaard, the ‘leaps’ of 
ethical and religious transition are not necessarily acts of will, but shifts of vision akin 
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to Wittgensteinian  ‘aspect dawning’. In particular, they are often realisations that a 
particular ‘vision’ has ‘taken hold’ of one, such that it has become “so real that it 
seems to be the only way to see it”.30 The kind of attractive redescription that makes 
such a ‘leap’ possible for a person could come about as a result of imaginative 
identification or engagement with a ‘higher’ ethical perspective. I suggest that 
Climacus views irony and humour as boundary zones largely because they involve 
this kind of imaginative identification or engagement.  
 
Relatedly, Roberts suggests that since a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour “is a 
power to see by the light of the virtues, it is a form of wisdom and therefore a 
capacity which in the higher reaches of its development surely must be counted 
among the virtues.”31 In fact, I don’t see how this conclusion – that a sense of humour 
is a distinct virtue – is supposed to follow. But we do not need to agree with Roberts 
on this specific point to agree with his later, more plausible, conclusion that “humor, 
and a sense for it, can function as a bridge to virtue, a device of moral education: 
moral humor can draw into the moral life persons who are on the periphery of it.”32
 
Exposure to such ‘virtuous’ rather than ‘vicious’ humour is an example of the 
kind of conditioning out of inappropriate responses that is central to a broadly 
Aristotelian account of moral education. And if such a perspective that we are 
initially brought into by a skilful humorist eventually becomes ‘second nature’ (the 
aim of training in virtue, on Aristotle’s account), then the humour in which we take 
pleasure is an example of “being properly affected”: of taking pleasure “at the right 
times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the 
right way”.  
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V. “Moral vision” and the sense of humour 
 
Before leaving the foregoing behind, it is worth noting why the references to 
‘vision’ and ‘aspect dawning’ are important. Having a “Socratic” sense of humour is 
indeed a matter of having a certain “vision”: it cannot be reduced to, say, holding 
certain beliefs.33 The philosopher who perhaps more than any other has been 
responsible for putting the metaphor of ‘moral vision’ on the ethical map is Iris 
Murdoch. Murdoch claims:  
When we apprehend and assess other people we do not consider only their 
solutions to specifiable practical problems, we consider something more elusive 
which may be called their total vision of life, as shown in their mode of speech 
or silence, their choice of words, their assessments of others, their conception of 
their own lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they think 
funny: in short the configurations of their thought which show continually in 
their reactions and conversation. These things, which may be overtly and 
comprehensibly displayed or inwardly elaborated and guessed at, constitute 
what … one may call the texture of a man’s being or the nature of his personal 
vision.34  
Two points in relation to this quote are important here. First, and most obviously, 
Murdoch’s inclusion of “what they think funny” on this list of constituent parts of a 
person’s vision is obviously significant for our purposes. Second, her overall point 
about a person’s ‘vision’ is true of our Socrates: that is why, as alluded to earlier, it is 
dangerous to try to demonstrate his sense of humour simply by quoting isolated 
examples of it.  
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Let us summarise and recap the argument so far. If a person’s sense of humour 
can betoken something of his character, and if our training in virtue must take place 
by reference to an exemplary virtuous agent, then it is prima facie plausible that such 
an agent’s sense of humour might be a useful moral-pedagogical tool. I think that my 
claim here makes explicit what Roberts probably has in mind when he suggests that 
“considered as an educational device” humour “can be a way of communicating, in 
something like a vision, some distinctions fundamental to an ethical view of life”.35 
And we can accept this conclusion regardless of whether we accept Roberts’ further 
claim that a certain kind of sense of humour is a distinct virtue.  
 
VI. The “ethical evasion” objection 
 
But let us return at this point to the objection trailed earlier. This objection was 
that laughter – especially at oneself – could amount to a form of ethical evasion. For 
instance, Reinhold Niebuhr claims that laughter after having recognised “the depth of 
evil” is “the instrument of irresponsibility”36: a failure, ultimately, to take either the 
self or life with sufficient seriousness. This point, put excessively dogmatically for 
my taste by Niebuhr, is put somewhat more persuasively by Conrad Hyers:  
It is possible to laugh at oneself as a way of excusing oneself, as a technique for 
not looking candidly at oneself, and of casually evading the deeper necessities 
of repentance, seeking forgiveness, and gaining restitution and change. Here 
humor, instead of being the servant of seriousness ... becomes the screen of 
irresponsibility ... Humor can become an easy path of escape from intellectual 
labor, moral accountability, and religious commitment.37  
(I take it that any reader put off by the religious dimension of Hyers’ way of putting 
this point can readily imagine a purely secular ethical version of the same point.) 
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That this can happen is undeniably true. But we are now in a position to see that 
this objection simply reinforces the overall point for which I have been arguing. 
There is no reason to suppose that the kind of Socratic humour we have been 
considering falls foul of this objection. Insofar as this humour is rooted in a 
perspective of virtue, and a realisation of the continual need to do ethical work on 
oneself in the life of developing virtue, such humour is, ultimately, “the servant of 
seriousness”.38 Anyone who fell into the trap that Hyers highlights would no longer 
be practising this ‘humour of virtue’. The objection therefore simply reinforces the 
importance of our looking towards the right exemplars or role models.  
 
VII. Criticizing Roberts: compassion, hope and attention to the particular 
 
So far, the position I have outlined is broadly sympathetic to that of Roberts, 
though I have aimed to make more explicit than he does how such a position is rooted 
in Aristotle. Let me now start to put some distance between Roberts and me.  
 
We noted earlier in passing the importance of fine ‘discernment’ to Aristotle’s 
view of moral judgement. This discernment, Aristotle claims, lies in “perception”. 
Now consider the idea that such discernment might involve recognising links 
between, and the inter-dependence of, certain virtues. Many virtues are only that if 
allied to certain other virtues. (In saying this, I am not subscribing to a full-blown 
‘unity of the virtues’ thesis, but only to the weaker claim that some traits cannot be 
virtues if separated from some other virtues.) It seems plausible to think that 
something similar might be true of a sense of humour. But Roberts’ claim in this 
respect is too strong. He claims that “a sense of humour cannot be a virtue unless it is 
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allied with compassion and hope”.39 I have already questioned the need to describe a 
sense of humour as a specific virtue. But even allowing for this, need we agree that a 
sense of humour cannot be ‘virtuous’ in our broader sense – that is, useful in the 
development of the virtues – unless it is allied with compassion or hope? I see no 
reason to suppose so. First, as mentioned earlier, Roberts does not give any especially 
compelling reason why these two specific virtues should be selected for such special 
treatment. Second, this part of Roberts’ thesis is offered at too high a degree of 
generality. Let us consider these points in turn.  
 
Roberts introduces the need for compassion and hope in response to the 
discomfort he anticipates his reader might feel with the idea of someone such as 
Socrates “being amused at something as tragic as the failure of a human being to 
achieve his most essential well-being. Is there not something morally defective about 
a person who can be amused by this sort of thing?”40 Consequently, he claims that the 
Socratic sense of humour is only virtuous if it brings with it a sense of hope for those 
at whom one is amused, which he contrasts with an aloofness and indifference to their 
well being. (“If it is ever fitting to be amused by somebody’s being lost, it must be on 
the supposition that there is hope for him.”41) He claims that “Socrates’ philosophy of 
persons seems to allow for hope that they may, in some mode of existence, come to 
themselves”,42 and behind this hope “must be a compassion which really does wish 
them well”.43 It is far from clear to me that Socrates is always this optimistic, and it 
may be that there are better exemplars under this aspect than him. If one were to make 
the best case one could for this part of Roberts’ thesis, one might better turn to the 
Catholic short story writer Flannery O’Connor. Compassion and hope play a vital role 
in O’Connor’s often humorous stories. O’Connor portrays characters who are in many 
ways odious, and although we find ourselves laughing at them (rather than with 
18 
them), we are typically not encouraged to do so in a sneering fashion. Two of 
O’Connor’s best stories - “Everything that rises must converge” and “Revelation” - 
end with a kind of revelation in which the key characters - the arrogant young student 
Julian and the self-righteous bigot Mrs. Turpin - come to see themselves for what they 
are, but in a way that allows for repentance and the improvement of their character. In 
what follows, I shall focus on “Revelation”. It would be hard to imagine anyone 
further from the Socratic maxim of “know thyself” than Mrs. Turpin. A snob and a 
racial bigot, she makes snap judgements of everyone she meets, but is utterly 
convinced of her own right to a place in heaven. The following passage gives a sense 
of Mrs. Turpin’s character:  
Sometimes at night when she couldn’t go to sleep, Mrs. Turpin would occupy 
herself with the question of who she would have chosen to be if she couldn’t 
have been herself. If Jesus had said to her before he made her, “There’s only 
two places available for you. You can either be a nigger or white-trash”, what 
would she have said? “Please, Jesus, please”, she would have said, “just let me 
wait until there’s another place available”, and he would have said, “No, you 
have to go right now and I have only those two places so make up your mind”. 
She would have wiggled and squirmed and begged and pleaded but it would 
have been no use and finally she would have said, “All right, make me a nigger 
then – but that don’t mean a trashy one.” And he would have made her a neat 
clean respectable Negro woman, herself but black. … 
Sometimes Mrs. Turpin occupied herself at night naming the classes of 
people. On the bottom of the heap were most colored people, not the kind she 
would have been if she had been one, but most of them; then next to them – not 
above, just away from – were the white-trash; then above them were the home-
owners, and above them the home-and-land owners, to which she and Claud 
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[her husband] belonged. Above she and Claud were people with a lot of money 
and much bigger houses and much more land. But here the complexity of it 
would begin to bear in on her, for some of the people with a lot of money were 
common and ought to be below she and Claud and some of the people who had 
good blood had lost their money and had to rent and then there were colored 
people who owned their own homes and land as well. There was a colored 
dentist in town who had two red Lincolns and a swimming pool and a farm with 
registered white-face cattle on it. Usually by the time she had fallen asleep all 
the classes of people were moiling and roiling around in her head …44
 
At the end of the story, her revelation as she cleans out the hogs45 is of “a vast 
horde of souls rumbling toward heaven”, in which “a tribe of people whom she 
recognized as those who, like her and Claud, had always had a little of everything”46 
march behind the blacks and “white trash” to whom Mrs. Turpin has always 
unquestioningly taken herself to be superior. In O’Connor’s Catholic vision, Mrs. 
Turpin’s revelation shows her the fundamental equality before God of all humans – 
including those she has always looked down upon. “The first shall be last, and the last 
shall be first.” I suggest that O’Connor’s compassion is shown in the fact that, 
however awful Mrs. Turpin is, we are never encouraged to sneer at her. And her hope 
is shown in the thought that even someone as narrow-minded as Mrs. Turpin might 
come to see the error of her ways. My point is that, although O’Connor undoubtedly 
encourages us to laugh at Mrs. Turpin, the presence of this compassion and hope 
gives the humour a fundamentally different character from what it would have if we 
had just been encouraged to sneer at her. Although writers on humour often 
distinguish between ‘laughing with’ and ‘laughing at’, the above draws our attention 
to the fact that there are also very different kinds of  ‘laughing at’.  
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So there are certainly cases in which compassion and hope are allies in a 
‘virtuous’ sense of humour. Moreover, this is one way of glossing a claim made by 
Kierkegaard: that a sense for the comic needs to be balanced with a sense of pathos.47 
But consider another case relevant to the virtues. Isn’t there such a thing as a sense of 
humour that lacks both compassion and hope and yet which can be redeemed by its 
ability to foster the self-recognition upon which self-knowledge depends? Much satire 
answers this description. Consider, for instance, the following description of a 
university departmental meeting, from Malcolm Bradbury’s novel The History Man:  
Then the alarm clock of Benita Pream, the administrative assistant, pings; 
Professor Marvin coughs very loudly and waves his arms. He looks up and down 
the long table, and says: “Can we now come to order, gentlemen?” Immediately 
the silence breaks; many arms go up, all round the table; there is a jabber of voices. 
“May I point out, Mr. Chairperson, that of the persons in this room you are 
addressing as ‘gentlemen’, seven are women?” says Melissa Todoroff. “May I 
suggest the formulation ‘Can we come to order, persons?’ or perhaps ‘Can we 
come to order, colleagues?’ “Doesn’t the phrase itself suggest we’re somehow 
normally in a state of disorder?” asks Roger Fundy … The meeting has started; 
and it is always so. … Benita Pream’s alarm has pinged at 14.00 hours, according 
to her own notes; it is 14.20 before the meeting has decided how long it is to 
continue, and whether it is quorate, and if it should have the window open, and 
14.30 before Professor Marvin has managed to sign the minutes of the last 
meeting, so that they can begin on item 1 of the agenda of this one, which concerns 
the appointment of external examiners for finals: “An uncontentious item, I think”, 
says Professor Marvin.  
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 It is 15.05 before the uncontentious item is resolved. Nobody likes the two 
names proposed by Professor Marvin. But their dissents are founded on such 
radically different premises that no two other names can be proposed from the 
meeting and agreed upon. A working party is suggested, to bring names to the next 
meeting; no one can agree on the membership of the working party. A select 
committee of the department is proposed, to suggest names for the working party; 
no one can agree on the membership of the select committee. A recommendation 
that Senate be asked to nominate the members of the select committee who will 
nominate the members of the working party who will make proposals for 
nominations so that the departmental meeting can nominate the external examiners 
is defeated, on the grounds that this would be external interference from Senate in 
the affairs of the department: even though, as the chair points out, the department 
cannot in any case nominate external examiners, but only recommend names the 
Senate, who will nominate them. A motion that the names of the two external 
examiners originally recommended be put again is put, and accepted. The names 
are put again, and rejected. A motion that there be no external examiners is put, 
and rejected. Two ladies in blue overalls come in with cups of tea and a plate of 
biscuits, and place cups in front of all the people present. A proposal that, since the 
agenda is moving slowly, discussion continue during tea is put and accepted, with 
one abstainer, who takes his cup of tea outside and drinks it there. The fact that tea 
has come without an item settled appears to have some effect: a motion that 
Professor Marvin be allowed to make his own choice of external examiners, acting 
on behalf of the department, is put and accepted. Professor Marvin promptly 
indicates that he will recommend to Senate the two names originally mentioned, an 
hour before; and then he moves onto the next item.48
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This wonderful passage is likely to ring a bell with any lecturer or professor 
who has experienced the pedantry, time-wasting and petty power-mongering of many 
a meeting. The passage is hardly characterized by compassion and hope. Yet it is 
important to note that many readers may come to recognize in such satire aspects not 
only of their colleagues but also of themselves. Such self-recognition, and the self-
knowledge that can stem from it, is surely an important dimension of a training in 
virtue, and so the related sense of humour – even if it lacks compassion and hope - 
cannot be dismissed as devoid of virtue.  
 
What could Roberts say in response to this? Perhaps that such satire might be 
thought to manifest hope at least insofar as its ultimate aim is to improve people. But 
this seems to me somewhat forced. If it does not strike you thus in this particular case, 
then consider the following remark from Philip Larkin, on why a writer should have a 
regular job. As a writer, Larkin morosely explains, one often wakes up and wants to 
slit one’s throat. Whereas in a regular job, within fifteen minutes at work, you will 
want to slit someone else’s throat.49 Clearly, to describe such a line as either 
compassionate or hopeful would seem forced. But while it is far from clear that such a 
line manifests virtue, such ‘black’ humour can play a significant role in the 
development of the virtues insofar as we are forced to recognize what we are, at least 
sometimes, like. In other words, again, such humour fosters the self-recognition upon 
which self-knowledge depends. To exclude such humour from the realm of virtue – 
perhaps even to denigrate it as ‘vicious’ – would be to overlook an important fact. 
Sometimes, the pills we need to swallow are more bitter than Roberts allows, and it is 
not clear that a humour of manifest compassion and hope is best placed to bring about 
the recognition that we need. (Nobody knew this better than Jonathan Swift.) Roberts 
includes ‘black’ humour on his list of the varieties of humour he considers to be 
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“positively reprehensible”.50 Yet no reasons are given in support of this. What I am 
suggesting is that, in denigrating such humour in this way, Roberts misses a 
potentially important dimension of humour’s ethical significance.  
 
One could go further against Roberts by considering a further kind of ‘black’ 
humour, related somewhat to the Larkin line: the kind of ironic humour that, again, 
shows no signs of either compassion or hope, but which nevertheless recognizes the 
human need to ‘go on’ with life despite its capacity to disappoint. An obvious 
example comes from Dorothy Parker:  
Razors pain you; 
Rivers are damp; 
Acids stain you; 
And drugs cause cramp.  
Guns aren”t lawful; 
Nooses give;  
Gas smells awful; 
You might as well live.51
 
 Again, it would be pushing one’s luck to describe the last line as manifesting 
hope. So it would seem – as with the Bradbury and Larkin cases – that insofar as such 
ironic humour excludes compassion and hope, it could not count, for Roberts, as 
virtuous. But, for reasons similar to those given above, I don’t see why such a sense 
of humour should be ‘out of bounds’ to a person developing the virtues. Why, 
exactly, should such a person shy away from such a sense of irony?  
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 The conclusion we can draw from all this is that Roberts’ claim - that a sense 
of humour, in order to be virtuous, must be allied with compassion and hope - is too 
strong, too broad-brush. He perhaps recognizes this when, at one part of his 
discussion, he seems to qualify his earlier claim. He claims that a sense of humour 
would not be a moral virtue if it were “isolated from certain other virtues, such as 
compassion and hope”.52 On this view, perhaps he would concede that compassion 
and hope might, in some circumstances, be replaceable with other virtues. But it 
would be a mistake to go down the road of trying to isolate what other virtues or 
attitudes, as well as compassion and hope, might be candidates for this role. What we 
need is a less general approach than this: more “attention to the particular” and a 
greater sensitivity to context. Our earlier discussion enables us to see why. In the 
discussion of O’Connor, for instance, only by paying attention to the particular 
context in which the humour occurs were we able to see that there can be significantly 
different cases of  ‘laughing at’, some of which should certainly not attract our ethical 
censure.  
 
VIII. Summary and conclusion 
 
Let us recap. I’ve suggested, following Roberts, that there are certain forms of 
moral wisdom that are partially constituted by the possession of a certain kind of 
sense of humour. I’ve also suggested, as a specific instance of Aristotle’s general 
claim that what one takes pleasure in is an index of one’s character, that one’s sense 
of humour is an index of one’s character. Moreover, exposure to a virtuous sense of 
humour (such as that of Socrates) – and the corresponding ‘moral vision’ of which it 
is a part – can be a useful tool in moral education. This is again a specific instance of 
a more general claim of Aristotle’s: that moral character is developed via habituation. 
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But we can accept all this without agreeing that a sense of humour is a distinct virtue. 
Roberts is also right to think that part of the fine discernment so important to moral 
perception will require us to see that a sense of humour could only count as ‘virtuous’ 
(in our broader sense) if linked to other virtues. However, he does not take on board 
an important implication of this claim. For I have also argued that Roberts is wrong to 
suppose that this can be cashed out on so general a level as the claim that a 
combination of compassion and hope is always necessary. In reply to his position, as 
well as pointing out that he gives no compelling case as to what is so special about 
these two particular virtues, I have also aimed to make plausible the idea that even 
humour lacking these qualities can nevertheless play ethically important roles, such as 
fostering the self-recognition on which self-knowledge depends. Insofar as self-
knowledge is an essential factor in the development of the virtues, such humour 
cannot legitimately be excluded from the realm of the ‘virtuous’ sense of humour. 
And we shall be best placed to see this precisely by being sensitive to the context in 
which such humour occurs: by paying “attention to the particular”. Writers on the 
virtues commonly stress the importance of their context-dependence. A ‘virtuous 
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